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Motivated by new evidence that managerial incentives play an important role in determining 
firm productivity, this paper incorporates the principal-agent mechanism into the new 
heterogeneous firm trade framework to examine the link between openness and endogenous 
firm productivity. We show that firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the effects of 
openness on firms’ optimal incentive contracts via the trade-induced “carrot and stick” effect. 
This mechanism increases the marginal value of managerial effort, which motivates the firm 
owners (principals) to offer a higher power contract to the managers (agents) to reduce 
managerial slacks. The intra-firm managerial incentive mechanism stressed in this paper could 
be viewed as complementary to the inter-firm reallocation effect in the Melitz (2003) model in 
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Why might openness enhance productivity? Motivated by new empirical evidence that managerial 
incentives play an important role in determining firm productivity, this paper examines the link between 
openness and endogenous firm productivity by incorporating the principal-agent mechanism into the new 
heterogeneous firm trade framework. We show that firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the effects of 
openness on firms’ optimal incentive contracts and productivity via the trade-induced “carrot and stick” 
effect. In the equilibrium where firms are substantially heterogeneous and self-select into the export 
market, increasing trade openness may reward the low-cost global exporters whilst penalising the high-
cost purely domestic firms. This will increase the value of managerial effort devoted to cost reduction, 
which motivates the firm owners (principals) to offer a higher power contract to the managers (agents) to 
reduce managerial slacks. As a result, managerial incentives and efforts increase, leading to 
improvements in firm and industrial productivity. However, this mechanism may not be at work when trade 
liberalization is driven by falling fixed cost of exporting, or when firms are quasi-homogenous and all 
export in equilibrium. In the later case, increasing openness may even lead to weaker managerial 
incentives and losses in firm productivity. 
Recent micro level trade studies have found robust empirical evidence that increasing exposure to trade 
via declining trade costs leads to significant productivity gains at both firm and industry level. We argue 
that, the interactions between the intra-firm managerial incentive mechanism and the degree of firm 
heterogeneity stressed in this paper, could be viewed as complementary to the inter-firm reallocation 
effect in the Melitz (2003) model in explaining the observed link between openness and aggregate 
productivity.  
   1
1. Introduction  
 
The relationship between openness and productivity might be one of the most fundamental 
questions in international economic studies. It is often argued that openness could raise 
productivity, yet there has been little consensus on the mechanisms through which such 
positive effects would occur. Recent micro-level empirical trade studies shed some new 
light on this issue by providing robust evidence on the link between firm heterogeneity and 
trade. Firstly, a new empirical regularity emerging from the literature is that firms exhibit 
astounding differences in their productivity performances even within very narrowly 
defined industries1  , and such heterogeneity is found to be an important dimension to 
international trade. Specifically, exporting firms are more productive, larger and more skill 
intensive than non-exporters and this is mainly due to the self-selection effect into the 
export market. (See for example, the pioneering work by  Bernard and Jensen 1999, 
Clerides et al. 1998, and Bernard 2007 and Greenaway and Kneller 2007 for survey). 
Secondly, the literature also offers strong evidence on productivity gains stemming from 
firm level responses to increasing exposure to trade driven by falling trade barriers (see for 
example , Pavnick 2002, Bernard, Jensen and Schott. 2006). In particular, after analysing 
the US plants’ responses to increasing exposure to trade via falling trade costs, Bernard, 
Jensen and Schott (2006) concludes:   
 
“ We find that greater exposure to international trade via declining trade costs promotes 
productivity gains at three levels: across industries within manufacturing, across plants 
within industries, and within plants.”  (p 918 , emphasis added) 
 
  “…we provide the first comprehensive evidence of a relationship between trade 




                                                 
1 See for example , Foster , Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005) shows the dramatic differences in their labour 
productivity in the same five digit industry.    2
Whilst the across plant reallocation effects of trade is well explored in the burgeoning 
heterogeneous firm trade models pioneered by Melitz (2003)2, there is little consensus on 
why increasing exposure to trade could lead to within firm productivity gains, which is 
perhaps an equally important channel as the reallocation effect via which trade boosts 
aggregate productivity. One seemingly straightforward explanation for the trade-induced 
firm productivity gains is that more fierce competition from foreign rivals reduces 
managerial slack. But most of the theoretical IO literature on competition and X-
(in)efficiency derives ambiguous results ( see for example, Holmstrom 1982, Nalebuff and 
Stiglitz 1983, Hart 1983, Scharfstein 1988, Schmidt 1997, Raith 2006), and none of these 
models explicitly examines the effects of openness and international trade3. Further, as the 
current wave of globalization is increasingly driven by multilateral reduction in trade costs, 
the “innovation upon import competition” argument may not be able to fully capture the 
effects of openness when an economy is opened up to both import competition and export 
opportunities.  One explanation for why opening up to export market may boost firm 
productivity is the learning-by-exporting hypothesis, but the empirical evidence on this is 
weak and highly ambiguous. (see for example, Clerides et. al 1998 and Greenaway and 
Kneller 2007 for a review).   
 
In this paper we attempt to bring trade theory closer to the new firm level evidence on the 
openness-productivity nexus by incorporating the principal-agent mechanism into the new 
heterogeneous firm trade framework pioneered by Melitz (2003). Motivated by recent 
evidence that managerial incentives could be an important determinant of firm productivity 
(Bandiera, Barankay, Rasul  2007)4 , we build a monopolistic competitive industry model 
where firm owners (principals) provide incentive contracts to the managers (agents) to 
reduce managerial slacks. Firm productivity is a stochastic outcome that increases in 
managerial efforts, which in turn respond to the power of the optimal incentive scheme. 
Firm productivity is thus determined by the optimal contractual choice of the managerial 
incentives, which is endogenous to the characteristics of the industry such as entry costs, 
                                                 
2 In Melitz (2003) where firms differ substantially in their productivities, opening up to trade leads to 
aggregate productivity gains by reallocating market shares towards more productive firms that export and 
expand, away from least productive firms that remain purely domestic and shrink or exit. Bernard, Redding 
and Schott (2006) incorporates heterogeneous firms into Heckcher-Ohlin framework and shows opening up to 
trade leads to both across industry and within industry reallocation of resources. 
.  
4  For example , Bandiera , Barankay and Rasul (2007) show from their firm level field experiment that that 
stronger managerial incentives raises worker productivity . In another empirical study, Bloom and Reenen 
(2007) shows that management practice is highly associated with firm productivity.     3
product differentiation etc. and, most importantly, the degree of the openness of the 
economy.  
 
One distinguishing feature of our model is that firm heterogeneity plays a crucial role in the 
directions of the effects of increasing openness on managerial incentives and firm 
productivity.  To stress its importance we investigate two possible types of equilibria in the 
open economy.  In the first scenario, firms differ substantially in their marginal costs and 
trade barriers are high, so that in equilibrium only a fraction of firms self-select into the 
export market: only lowest cost firms will export to the global markets whilst the highest 
cost firms will remain purely domestic. We call such equilibrium “heterogeneous firm trade 
equilibrium”. (HFT) In this case, increasing openness- triggered by falling variable trade 
costs - will unambiguously increase the power of the incentive contract, leading to stronger 
managerial incentives and compensation, and thus reduces managerial slacks. The main 
reason for this is that the “carrot and stick” effect is at work: when trade costs fall, the 
lowest-cost exporting firms will be rewarded with the “carrot” of increasing profits and 
outputs due to their further expansions into the global markets, whilst the high cost 
domestic firms will be penalized by the “stick” of decreasing domestic profits and outputs 
as a result of the increasing foreign competition. Consequently, the marginal value of cost-
reducing managerial effort, determined by the profit differential between the low and high 
cost status, will increase5.  As the managerial effort becomes more “valuable” to the firm, 
the owner is motivated to induce the managers to exert greater effort by providing a more 
powerful incentive contract and raise managerial compensation. In other words, when trade 
costs fall, firms have greater incentives to motivate their managers to work harder, so as to 
increase the probability of being rewarded with the “carrot” and reduce the risk of being 
penalized by the “stick”. This could ultimately reduce managerial slacks and boosts firm 
level and industrial productivity.  Finally, both consumers and managers are better off, 
since the improvement of firms’ internal efficiencies leads to falling prices and boosts 
managerial pay. However, in contrast to Melitz (2003), falling fixed costs of exporting may 
not always lead to stronger managerial incentives and boost productivity. This is because 
the “carrot and stick” effect becomes ambiguous: the profits of low-cost exporters may not 
                                                 
5 This is a common feature in the Schumpetarian literature and endogenous growth models that the incentive 
of cost reduction depends not on the absolute level of profits, but the profit differential between high and low 
cost status. Changes in the economic environment may dampen the incentive to reduce cost as long as the 
profit differential falls, even if the absolute size of profits increases. See for example , Schmidt (1997).      4
always increase their profits, although the high-cost purely domestic firms will always 
suffer from a profit loss.  
 
To examine the importance of heterogeneity in driving these results, we investigate a 
second type of equilibrium in which trade costs are low and the degree of firm 
heterogeneity is small so that all firms export in equilibrium, we call this “quasi-
homogeneous firms trade equilibrium”(QHF). In contrast to the HFT equilibrium, 
increasing openness will never enhance managerial incentives and firm productivity in this 
case. The main reason for this is that when all firms export in equilibrium, falling trade 
costs affect the profits of all firms in the same direction: all firms increase their profits in 
the export markets but lose profits and market shares in their domestic markets.  The net 
result is unchanged firm level total profits and output (when variable trade costs fall) or a 
decreasing profit differential between low and high cost firms (when the fixed cost of 
exporting falls). The “carrot and stick effects” is not at work at all. Consequently, when the 
economy is more opened up , the value of managerial efforts to the firm does not increase, 
and thus firms has no incentives to further reduce managerial slack and firms’ internal 
efficiencies will not improve.    
 
The contrasts between the HFT equilibrium and the QHF equilibrium reveal that , firm 
heterogeneity is not only vital to the inter-firm reallocation effects via which openness 
boosts productivity as stressed in Melitz (2003), but also could be the key dimension to 
explain the intra-firm productivity gains induced by trade liberalization.  Whilst increasing 
openness of the economy may reallocate the market shares away from low productivity 
firms towards high productivity firms, our analysis show that firms may not only react 
passively  by adjusting their output margins, but also foresee such new threats and 
opportunities and thus adapt their internal contract structure proactively to cope with the 
changing global market environment. Hence, by incorporating the principal-agent problem 
into the heterogeneous firm trade framework, we may attribute the trade-induced intra-firm 
productivity gains at least partly to the optimal incentive contract mechanism, which could 
be viewed as complementary to the inter-firm reallocation mechanism in the original Melitz 
(2003) model in explaining the link between openness and aggregate productivity.  
 
Our model adds to the small but fast growing theoretical literature on the link between 
openness on and endogenous firm productivity. The model closest to ours is Trindade   5
(2005), whose approach mainly focuses on the leisure-income trade-off decisions by   firm 
owners. Motivated by the responses of firm owners facing import competition in Portugal, 
he reveals a new mechanism via which import competition boosts firm productivity. In his 
model, import competition increases total varieties of goods available to the consumers, 
which reduces the real price of consumption basket and increases the value of income. 
Since firm owners are also consumers who “love variety”, they are motivated to work 
harder (seeking for better technology) and raise income, leading to higher productivity. In a 
related recent study, Davidson, Matusz and Shevchenko (2008) builds a model with 
perfectly competitive product market and imperfect labour market with heterogeneous 
workers, they explore the impact of openness on firm productivity via the mechanism of 
changing skill mix within firms that differ in their technology choices. Our model focuses 
on a quite different mechanism from the above two papers, stressing the importance of 
export market selection based on the recent heterogeneous firm trade framework, and 
explains the trade-induced productivity gains focuses on the role of principle-agent 
mechanism within firms that is perhaps more prevalent for firms in developed countries 
such as those in the US (see Bernard et al.2006).   
 
Our model can also be viewed as complementary to Horn, Lang, Lundgren (1994) and 
Marin and Verdier (2007), which we found to be the few theoretical contributions focusing 
the link between openness and managerial incentives. Horn, Lang, Lundgren (1994) adopt a 
very different industry structure with a fixed number of oligopolistic competitive firms 
whose owners hire managers to organise production. Moving from autarky to free trade 
increases output of all firms that export, and also raises labour costs, leading to stronger 
managerial incentives to save labour costs and affect firms X-efficiency. Marin and Verdier 
(2007) argue that international trade affects industry productivity by affecting the 
distribution of the modes of corporation organization – in terms of the internal power 
allocation between the headquarter and middle manager.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the key 
features of the model. In section 3 we proceed to the open economy model by investigating 
the HFT and QHF equilibrium separately. This is followed by section 4 , in which we 
compare and contrast the results from the two equilibriums , and discuss the important role 
of firm heterogeneity and the “carrot and stick” effects. Some concluding remarks are made 
in section 5. Most of the details of proofs are relegated to the Appendix.   6
2. The Closed Economy  
 
The model builds upon the well-known workhorse Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of trade 
in the presence of horizontal product differentiation and monopolistic competition (Dixit 
and Stiglitz, 1977; Krugman, 1980). We incorporate across firm heterogeneity (Melitz 
2003) and the within firm incentive contract between the owner and the manager as the key 
mechanism that endogenises firm productivity. We start with considering a closed economy 
in which a single factor (labour) is used to produce output in two sectors. Sector H 
produces a homogenous good and sector D differentiated products.  
 
2.1 Demand and production 
 
The preferences of a representative consumer are Cobb-Douglas across the outputs of the 
two sectors, with E  being the total expenditure and β   the fraction of expenditure on 
differentiated products. Production in sector H exhibits constant return to scales and we 
choose the homogenous good as the numeriarie. Selecting units so that one unit of labour is 
required to produce one unit of the homogenous good , implies the wage rates are also unity. 
Full employment is maintained through adjustment in the size of the H sector, so labour 
supply to sector D is perfectly elastic.  Preferences for sector D products are assumed to be 
the well-known C.E.S (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) form over a continuum of 
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Where the set Θ represents the varieties available to consumers. Elasticity of substitution 







σ . Consumer behavior in 
sector D can be modeled as if they were consuming an aggregate product  U Q ≡  with 
aggregate price  












i i di p P         
 
 





















− ≡ 1 P
E
A  is the demand shifter for each individual variety i that  is produced by a 
unique firm. Technology of production is characterised by the following cost function:  
 
[4]  E i i i f q a C + =   
 
Where  i C  is total cost, and  i a  and  E f are constant marginal cost and fixed entry cost in 
labour units, respectively.  
 
It is well-known that under the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, the pricing rule by 







p =             
    
Operating firm profit and revenues are then given by  
 
[6]  E i i i i i i f a B C q p a − ⋅ = − =
−σ π
1 ) (    ,  
σ σ
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1 ) ( i i i i i a B q p a r     
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[7]  () ()
1 1 1 1 1
− − − ⋅ − = − ≡
σ σ σ β ρ ρ ρ ρ P E A B     8








B is a transformed demand shifter that is considered as exogenous by individual firms.  It 
can also be viewed as an inverse measure of the competitiveness of the product market: a 
lower B corresponds to a lower aggregate price (P), leading to a lower firm level profit, 
indicating a market with greater competition. 
 
2.2   The optimal incentive contract  
 
The agency problem   
We assume the separation of ownership and control within the firm, leading to the 
existence of a standard principal-agent problem between the owner and the manager. The 
basic set up of the sequencing of firm behaviour is illustrated in figure 1. There is an 
unbounded mass of prospective entrants to sector D. During stage I, at date 0 firm owners 
decide whether to pay an irreversible sunk fixed cost  E f to enter the market. If the owner 
decided to enter, she will set up a plant and then hire a manager to organise the production 
and reduce costs at stage II. In this stage, the owner designs a managerial incentive contract 
that optimises her net expected payoff, and the manager will respond by choosing her 
optimal effort that maximises her expected utility, depending on the power of the incentive 
provided by the contract. Finally at stage III the production costs, which depend on the 
managerial efforts, will be realised, then firms will make decisions on their prices and 
1  0  2  3 
Firm owners pay 
sunk entry cost to 
enter the market 
Optimal incentive 











4  t 
Figure 1. Time Sequencing of the Firm Behavior  
Stage I : Entry  Stage II : Contract  Stage III : Production   9
outputs to maximise profits.  Payments to the owners and the managers are received, all 
markets clear. 
 
Next we show the details of the model stage by stage. Firstly, assume each firm in the 
market is owned by a principal (owner or shareholders), who pays the entry cost  E f  (e.g. 
research and development of the variety) to start a firm and then hires an agent (the 
manager) on a competitive market for identical agents. The main task of the manager is to 
exert effort and improve the firm’s productive efficiency by reducing the marginal cost of 
production  i a . For example , she can be  the head of a division monitoring the workers , 
controlling the quality of inputs , experimenting with new production methods etc. We 
assume that the outcome of the manager’s effort denoted as  i e , is uncertain because the 
marginal cost is affected by an independent and identically-distributed (i.i.d.) random 
influence  i α   ：   
 
Assumption 1   [] i i i e a α γ ) ( 1− =   , where   , 0 ) 0 ( = γ   , 1 ) ( lim =
∞ → i e e
i
γ 0 ) ( ' ≥ i e γ , 0 ) ( ' ' ≤ i e γ  
and  i α  is a i.i.d. random variable with cumulative distribution  ) (α F  and positive support 
[] M L α α ,  .   
 
Let  0 > α  denote the positive mean ofα . This assumption implies the firm’s expected 
marginal cost is  α γ α ) ( i e a − = . Hence , if the manager exerts zero effort (ei=0), the 
firm’s marginal costs will be purely random with mean α  ,  and ) ( i e γ  denotes  the 
proportional expected cost reduction resulting from increasing managerial effort. Also note 
that  0 ) ( ' ' ≤ e γ  , which indicates decreasing returns to efforts, i.e. the marginal (expected) 
reduction in costs decreases with increasing efforts. The c.d.f. of  cost ai  is therefore 
() [ ]
1 ) ( 1 ) ; (
− − = e a F e a G γ    with support [ ] M L a a ,  ,  where  [] ) ( 1 e a L L γ α − =  and 
[] ) ( 1 e a M M γ α − = 6.  
 
The firm owner(principal) is assumed to be risk neutral. Her payoff function is firm profit 
net of managerial compensation  i W :   
                                                 
6 Note that by this assumption, an increase in e  will change the upper and lower boundaries of   ) ; ( e a G .    10
 
[8]  i i i W − = Π π  
 
For simplicity the manager is also assumed to be risk neutral. Her utility function is  
 
[9]   ) ( i i M e D W U − =  
 
where ) ( i e D  is the manager’s disutility of effort and  0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' > > e D e D , with  0 ) 0 ( = D . 
We assume that, due to information asymmetry the manager’s effort is not observable to 
the owner. As a result, due to the steep disutility function of effort, the manager may get 
slack and not exert her maximum effort level. Hence, there is a standard moral hazard 
problem between the owner and the manager. The owner therefore will design an incentive 
scheme to reduce managerial slack and induce the manager to exert greater effort. Since 
managers are identical, they will choose the same effort level simultaneously, which will in 
turn determine the distribution as well as the average level of firm productivity.    
 
Optimal effort and the incentive contract 
The realized marginal cost a is assumed to be fully observable by the owner and therefore 
contractible. We assume that the owners offer their managers the following compensation 
scheme: 7  
 
[10]  ( )) 1 ( α i i a b s W − + =   
       
where  s   is fixed salary, b   is the “piece rate” and  ( ) α i a − 1   the (proportional) cost 
reduction observable by the principal. The firm owner’s problem is to design an optimal 
incentive scheme i.e. choose appropriate s and b in order to maximize her net expected 
payoff , which equals the expected operating profit net of expected manager 
                                                 
7Such linear compensation scheme is very common in business practice. It is also common in the theoretical 
IO literature on competition and X-(in) efficiency to assume a linear incentive contract (see for example, 
Raith 2006 ). In international economics studies, Grossman and Helpman (2004) also assume a linear contract 
between the firm and the agent to study firms’ outsourcing decisions.  Also see Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1987)  that shows the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to offer a linear contract. For 
a full discussion on the conditions under which the linear incentive scheme would be optimal, see Bolton and 
Dewatripont (2003).    11
compensation: ) (Π E =) ( ) ( W E E − π . Using [6] the firm’s expected operating profit can be 
written as: 
 
[11]         E
a
a f e BV e a dG a E
M
L
- ) ( ) ; ( ) ( ) ( = =∫ π π  
 
where  Ω Δ = =∫
− ) ( ) ; ( ) (
) (
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σ α α ) (
1 .Note that  0 ) ( ' > e V  , i.e firms’ expected operating profit increases with 
managerial effort. Hence, the owner’s problem can be written as (we suppress the firm 
index i hereafter): 
 
 
[12a]  {} { } [ ] { } E e b s e b s e b s
f e b s e BV W E E E - ) ( ) ( max ) ( ) ( max ) ( max
, , , , , ,
γ π + − = − = Π          
 
Subject to :  
 
[12b]       { } ) ~ ( ) ~ ( max arg
~ e D e b s e
e − ⋅ + ∈ γ       (Incentive Compatible Constraint) 
 
[12c]     r M U e D e b s U E ≥ − + = ) ( ) ( ) ( γ                                        (Participation  Constraint)                     
                     
 
The incentive compatible constraint gives the optimal effort exerted by the manager for 








= .  It can be shown that e is increasing in b 9, indicating that the 
manager will exert greater effort, the larger the reward of cost reduction offered by the 
owner. Further, the participation constraint [12c] gives the minimum compensation 
acceptable by the manager: she will accept any contract with pair {} s b,   that yields an 
                                                 
8 Assumption 1 ensures that the second order condition is always satisfied, which guarantees an internal 
solution.  
9 This can be derived straightforwardly from the assumption  0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' ' < > e e D γ .    12
expected utility of at least her reserve utility r U 10.  In order to maximise her payoff the 
owner will choose a salary scheme that drives the expected manager utility down to zero, 
implying that the owner will choose  r U e b e D s + − = ) ( ) ( γ  so  that  
r U e D e b s W E + = + = ) ( ) ( ) ( γ 11. Substitute this to [12a], we can rewrite the owner’s 
problem as:  
 
[13]  {} E r e f U e D e BV − − − ) ( ) ( max                      
 
The owner’s problem therefore is equivalent to choosing an optimal managerial effort (e) 
that maximises her expected net payoff. A higher effort will increase the owner’s expected 
operating profit, but also increases the compensation paid to the manager. Due to this trade-
off, the optimal e   therefore depend on the shape of the profit function as well as the 







B =    (OI :Optimal Incentive condition)    
 
Where  * e  denotes the optimal effort as a solution for problem [13] 12. We can therefore 
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e D s γ
γ
− =   
      
                                                 
10 For simplicity we assume  r U  is exogenous , in appendix we discuss the possibility of endogeneous reserve 
utility and why the qualitative result of our model will largely remain unaffected. 
11 This implies that the manager generate zero “rent” or “surplus” utility on average, a simplicification that is 
common in existing trade models with endogeneous manager/owner efforts , see for example Grossman and 
Helpman (2004), Horn et al. (1994) and Trindade (2005).    
12 Note that the second order condition 0 *) ( ' ' *) ( ' '
*) ( '
*) ( '
< − e D e V
e V
e D  is always satisfied since  0 ) ( ' ' < e γ .  It 
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 . 13  The  following  lemma 
summarises the above results: 
 
Lemma 1   For given market conditionB , the owner will design an optimal incentive 
contract with piece rate (b) and salary (s) given in (15)-(16), where the manager choose 
optimal effort  * e  specified in (14).   * e  is increasing in B and b , but decreasing in s.  
 
We close the model by assuming free entry of firms until the owner’s expected pay off is 
zero.  From [13], this condition can be written as: 
 
[17]   0 *) ( *) ( ) ( = − − − ≡ Π E r f U e D e BV E   (ZEP: Zero expected payoff condition)    
 
   
2.3  Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
 
The equilibrium can be determined by combining the ZEP condition ( equation [17] ) and 
the OI condition ( equation [14]) :  
 





B =      (OI) 
[18]      
             r E U f e D e BV + = − *) ( *) (    (ZEP) 
 
 
The equilibrium  * e and B are thus determined by the two different relationships between 
these two key endogenous variables.  Firstly, as can be seen in figure 2a, the (OI) condition 
defines an increasing relationship between  * e andB , whereas the (ZEP) condition defines a 
U shape relationship. The intuition for the U shape ZEP curve can be described as below. 
Along the ZEP curve, each pair of  * e and B  yields same (zero) net expected payoff for 
prospective owners. When  * e  is low and B is high, i.e. to the left of point E, an increase in 
* e  tends to increase the owner’s expected net payoff (profit net of compensation), this is 
                                                 
13 Use footnote 12 and assumption 0 ) ( ' ' ≤ e γ .    14
because the marginal increase in profit from cost reduction is high (due to high B) and the 
increase in compensation is low (due to low e * and therefore low marginal disutility of the 
manager). Hence, when e* increases B has to decline so as to keep the net payoff equal 
zero, yielding a downward slope. However when the pair  { } B e*,  passes point E so that 
* e is high, an increase in  * e  tends to decrease owner’s payoff  because the increase in 
manager compensation will be high as a result of her steep disutility function , whilst the 
increase in profit from cost reduction is low due to decreasing return of effort. This requires 
an increase in B  in order to keep the owner’s net payoff unchanged, implying an upward 
slope. The intersection of the (OI) and (ZEP) schedules is always at the ZEP curve’s bottom 
point E, which defines a unique pair of  ) *, ( B e at the equilibrium.14  A more formal proof 
of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium can be shown as follows. We can 
substitute [14] to [17] to obtain:  
 
[19]  r E U f e D e V
e V
e D
e J + = − ≡ *) ( *) (
*) ( '
*) ( '
*) (        
 
It can be shown that  *) (e J  is monotonically increasing in  * e  15, which ensures a unique 
and positive solution. The following proposition summarises the above results:  
 
 
PROPOSITION 1   Under free entry, there exists unique industry equilibrium in 
managerial efforts  * e  as defined in [19], and incentive contractual choices, in which each 
firm chooses an  optimal piece rate and salary as  defined in [15]-[16] .    
 
Since the equilibrium distribution over firms’ marginal costs  () [ ]
1 *) ( 1 *) ; (
− − = e a F e a G γ  is 
endogenous to e*, the distribution of firm level performances such as productivity, profit , 
size , etc. are also dependent on e* , which is in turn determined by our model parameters 
such as the entry costs , the elasticity of substitution and the shape of manager’s disutility 
function etc. However, it is worth noting that as shown in (19) the optimal effort  * e  is 
independent of aggregate revenue E, therefore the equilibrium distribution of firm marginal 
                                                 
14 See appendix A for a formal proof of why the ZEP curve is U shape.  
15  *) (
*) ( '
*) ( '














































e D . so 
*) ( ' e J >0.    15
cost *) ; ( e a G is also independent of the size of the market16. Thus, changes in market size 
will have no impact on firm level behaviors such as cost, price, output etc. The only effect 
of market size is to increase (proportionally) the number of firms.  
 
2.4 Analysis of the equilibrium  
 
Next we show how other key aggregate variables of the closed economy are determined in 
equilibrium and then conduct some comparative statics analysis. Firstly we can derive the 
number of firms N as a function of  * e 17  
 





























 (see footnote 11),  0 *) ( ' < e N  , so the greater the optimal managerial 
effort and incentive, the smaller the number of firms producing in the market.   Intuitively, 
greater managerial efforts leads to lower industry cost ( *) (e a  ), which intensifies market 
competition and therefore deters the entry of new firms. Reasoning analogously, other 
endogenous model variables can be derived as follows18:  
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= ,                                                               (Managerial incentive ) 
                                                 
16 . This result is common to models with constant elasticity of substitution between varieties. In Melitz(2003) 
where the elasticity of substitution is exogenous, market size also has no impact on the productivity cut off 
that determines the aggregate industry productivity. However, in a more general case where the elasticity of 
substitution is endogenous to market size, the firm level variables may indeed respond to market size.   
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Substitute this expression to [7] and we obtain 
1 1 1 1 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
− − − − ⋅ − = − ⋅ ⋅ ≡ N e V E P E B d β ρ ρ ρ β
σ σ . Using 
the expression of equilibrium B in equation [14],  we obtain the equilibrium number of firms as a function of 
the optimal effort : 
18 In this paper we adopt the presumption that the aggregate revenue E is exogenous. in appendix we discuss 
the case where E is endogenous and why our main results concerning managerial incentives and productivity 
remain unaffected.    16
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Clearly, these key variables of the economy all depend on  * e . It can further be shown that 
they are also monotonic functions of  * e :   0 *) ( ' < e a ,   0 *) ( ' > e b  ,  0 *) ( ' > e W  , 
0 *) ( ' > e P  ,  0 *) ( ' < e U   . Next we conduct comparative static analysis on how various 
shocks to the economy affect the equilibrium  * e   , leading to changes in the above 
economy-wide variables.   
 
Comparative Statics  
 
First consider the effect of the entry cost  E f .  From [18], it is obvious that an increase in 
E f  has no effects on the (OI) curve but shifts upwards the (ZEP) curve. Consequently, both 
the equilibrium  * e  and  B  will  increase when  E f   rises. Secondly, an increase in the 
elasticity of substitution σ  also increases  * e  andB . This can be shown in figure 2b: the 
ZEP curve shifts upward when σ  increases, whilst the OI curve will shift to the right19, 
the new equilibrium E’ therefore must locate at the top right of the original equilibrium.  
  
PROPOSITION 2   The power of the contract ( piece rate ) , managerial efforts and  
average managerial  compensation are higher , the higher the fixed entry cost ( E f ), or 
varieties are more substitutable(σ higher ).   
 
PROOF: see Appendix B 
 
                                                 
19 [14] can be written as  []
() *) ( 1









=  . Since  [ ] 1 , 0 *) ( ∈ e γ  ,  increasing σ  reduces B for 
given  * e  , meaning the OI curve will shift to the right for greater σ .  On the other hand, for the ZEP 
condition in [17], since increasing σ  increases  [ ] Ω − =
−σ γ
1 *) ( 1 *) ( e e V  , the ZEP curve will shift 
upwards for greater σ .    17
The intuition behind proposition 2 is that higher entry costs deter the entry of new firms, 
therefore each firm has greater market share and output, leading to a greater value of cost 
reduction. Thus, firm owners provide higher-power contracts (a higher piece rate b ) to 
managers to induce them greater exert efforts. Managerial compensation also has to 
increase to compensate for managers’ increasing disutility. Furthermore, an increase in the 
elasticity of substitution also reduces the number of firms as each firm charges lower prices, 
this again increases the output and market share of existing firms, leading to greater 
managerial incentives and compensation.  Based on proposition 2, we can further derive the 
effects of entry costs and the degree of product substitutability on welfare.  
 
COROLLARY 1.   Industrial cost, the number of varieties and total consumer welfare are 
higher, the lower fixed entry cost ( E f ), or the higher the degree of product differentiation 
(σ  lower).   
 
When entry costs fall or products are more substitutable, managerial efforts decreases, 
leading to higher average industry costs and lower productivity. On one hand, the 
increasing industry costs tend to push up average price and therefore be welfare reducing 
(the “efficiency effect”). But, on the other hand, the number of firms and total varieties will 
actually increase due to falling entry barriers or greater product differentiation. Such 
“variety effect” is certainly welfare enhancing, since consumers “love variety”. Perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that the variety effect dominates the efficiency effect, 
leading to a decrease in the aggregate price and an increase in welfare.  
 
The above results from the comparative statics, especially those on industrial productivity, 
are consistent with Raith (2003) but somewhat differ from those in the original Melitz 
model. Raith (2003) sets up a model of oligopolistic industry to study the relation between 
competition and managerial incentives. Despite the very different setup of his model to ours, 
both models yield the conclusion that lower degree of entry costs and product substitution 
will reduces managerial incentives and industrial productivity, but increase welfare. On the 
other hand, in Melitz(2003) lower entry costs will increase the threshold productivity 
required for firm survival ,and therefore raises industrial productivity. In our model, 
however, firm level productivity fall as firms provide weaker incentives to managers, who 
respond by exerting less effort that lowers firm and industry productivity. However, in both   18
models the welfare effects are positive for falling entry costs due to the dominate role of the 
variety effect.     
 
 
3.  The Open Economy  
 
Now we examine the case of open economy, where the world is composed of  m+1  
identical countries. We adopt the standard simplifying assumption that all countries 
produce the homogeneous good, which is always costlessly traded. Assuming that 
equilibrium in the constant returns-to-scale, homogeneous sector ties down the equilibrium 
wage, the wage will then be equalised across countries, which is normalized to one. In the 
absence of international trade costs in the differentiated good sector, opening up to trade 
will allow countries to replicate the outcomes of an integrated world economy. Firms will 
sell in all countries and therefore behave as if they were operating in an integrated world 
market. Trade has the same impact on countries in an open economy as would an increase 
in market size on a closed economy. As was previously described changes in market size 
has no impact on equilibrium firm behaviors. Most importantly, the optimal incentive 
contract within firms remain unchanged. As a result, the firm level performances such as 
marginal cost , prices and output are also the same as those in the closed economy. The 
difference, however, is that firms now divide their outputs into domestic and foreign sales. 
Further, consumers in each economy are better off, since they have access to a larger 
number of varieties. Hence, the existence of across firm heterogeneity and within firm 
incentive contract do not make substantial differences relative to the original Krugman 
model.  
 
But what if trade is costly? Recent empirical studies on firm level trade revealed that 
exporting incurs not only variable trade costs such as transport costs, but also fixed costs 
that is invariant to the export volume (see for example, Robert and Tybout 1997).  To 
capture such stylized facts we follow the heterogeneous firm trade literature pioneered by 
Melitz (2003) to assume that there exists fixed cost of exporting 0 > X f  in addition to the   19
traditional melting iceberg trade cost  1 > τ 20 . The assumption of a positive fixed export 
cost is crucial for firms’ self-selection into the export markets when they are heterogeneous 
in terms of productivity21. In the following analysis we first consider the equilibrium in 
which the degree of firm heterogeneity is high and trade costs are significant so that only a 
fraction of firms export.  We then compare and contrast the results to the second type of 
equilibrium where trade costs are low and firms are homogeneous so that all firms export. 
Such comparisons help to reveal the crucial role of firm heterogeneity                          
in the directions of the effects of increasing openness on intra-firm incentive contract and 
industrial productivity.   
 
3.1 Export selection, Firm heterogeneity and Managerial Incentives 
 
In this section we examine the effects of trade on managerial incentives where firms are 
substantially heterogeneous and trade barriers is high so that exporters self-select into the 




For a prospective exporter with marginal cost a, its potential export profit is given by (note 
the symmetric country assumption): 
  
[22]           () [ ] X X f a B m a − =
−σ τ π
1 ) (,   ] , [ M L a a a∈ ∀  
 
To ensure that firms select into the export market, the following assumption is imposed 
throughout this section: 
 
                                                 
20 For every one unit of good to arrive the export destination , τ units of goods have to be shipped.   
21 There is robust empirical evidence that only more productive firms become exporters because they can 
overcome the high fixed costs of breaking into the foreign markets , see Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and 
Tybout (2003) for a survey.     20
Assumption 2   Trade costs ( τ , X f ) are high relative to the fixed entry cost ( E f ) so that 






M X a B f   
 
This assumption guarantees the partitioning of firms by export status and productivity 
levels: only a fraction of firms with the lowest costs can earn a positive export profit, 
whereas export profits for the highest-cost firms are always negative: 
() 0 ) (
1 < − =
−
X M M X f a B a
σ τ π . Now define  X a   the export cost cut off such that 
0 ) ( = X X a π . From [22] we can obtain:   
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≡ X f   is a measure of the trade costs. Firms with marginal cost   
[] X L a a a , ∈ will export to all foreign markets , whilst those with  ( ] M X a a a , ∈  will remain 
purely domestic . The firm owner’s operating profit and revenue is then given by  
 
 
[25]   = ) (a π     E d f Ba a − =
−σ π
1 ) (     , non-exporters with  ( ] M X a a a , ∈  
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                         ( )
σ σ τ σ
− − + ⋅ = +
1 1 1 ) ( ) ( m Ba a r a r X d   ,  
                                                                         , exporters with  [ ] X L a a a , ∈  
                                                 
22 Note that both B and  M a are endogenous variables, but as will be shown latter, B is increasing in  E f  and 
M a  is decreasing in  E f . Thus when  E f  is sufficiently low, the right hand side of the inequality (20) will be 
sufficiently small to ensure that the inequality holds.   21
 
 
Thus, using [23], an entrant’s expected operating profit in the domestic and foreign markets 
are, respectively:  
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Hence, the firm’s total expected operating profit is  
 
[29]  E X X d f f e B Y e BV E E E − + = + = ) , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( τ π π π  
 
The compensation scheme to the managers will take the form of   )] / ( 1 [ α a b s W − + = as in 
the closed economy. Reasoning analogous to the case of the closed economy, the owner’s 
problem is then to design a contract that maximises her expected net payoff  ) ( ( W E E − ） π  , 
subject to the incentive compatible constraint and the participation constraint as described 
in [12b]-[12c]. So the owner’s total expected net payoff can be written as 23  
 
[30]   r E X U f e D f e B Y e BV W E E B e - ) ( ) , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ( − − + = − = Π τ π τ  
 
                                                 
23 Again , reasoning analogous to the case of the closed economy , we can obtain  ) ( ' / ) ( ' e e D b γ =  and 
r U e D W E + = ) ( ) ( .    22
Hence, the owner’s problem is  
 
[31]   ) ) ( ) , , ( ) ( ( max arg * r E X
e
U f e D ，f e B Y e BV e − − − + = τ  
 
This yields the following first order condition:  
 
[32] *) ( ' ) , *, , ( *) ( ' * e D f e B Y e BV X e = + τ    ( Optimal Incentive) 
 
Furthermore, to ensure that  * e  is the internal solution to the owner’s optimisation problem 
[31], we impose the following assumption so that the second order condition is satisfied: 
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Analogous to the case of the closed economy, [32] gives the condition under which the firm 
owner will choose the optimal managerial effort  * e  to maximise her net payoff in an open 
economy with trade costs  X f ， τ . It can further be shown that  
 
Lemma 2 :  Equation (32) defines B as an implicit  function of  * e , and B  is monotonically 
increasing in e*. 
  
Proof: see appendix C   
 
Finally, as in the closed economy equilibrium, the free entry condition leads to the zero 
total expected profit of prospective firm owners:    
 
[33]    0 - *) ( ) , *, , ( *) ( ) ， ， * , ( = − − + ≡ Π r E X X U f e D f e B Y e BV f e B τ τ    
 
Thus , [32] and [33] gives two different relationships between   * e  and B : 
 
      *) ( ' ) *, , ( *) ( ' * e D e B Y e BV e = + τ                                  [OI] 
         23
    r E X U f e D f e B Y e BV + = − + *) ( ) , *, , ( *) ( τ                  [ZEP] 
 
Again, analogous to the case of the closed economy, the OI and ZEP condition defines one 
upward sloping curve and one U shape relationship between B    and  * e . The unique 
intersection of these two schedules determines the two endogenous variables {} B e*, .  
 
PROPOSITION 3   Equation (32) and (33) determines a unique equilibrium pair {} B e*, , 







= .  
  
Proof:  See appendix D. 
 
It is noteworthy that the equilibrium B  is increasing in entry cost  E f . This is because 
increasing  E f  shifts the ZEP curve upwards whereas left OI curve unchanged, leading to a 
higher B and e*.   
 
The probability of exporting is then given by  
 
) ( *) ; ( X X ex F e a G p α = =   ,    ( ) [ ]
1 *) ( 1
− − = e B X γ φ α  
 
As was the case of the closed economy,  * e  plays an important role in determining the 
aggregate variables of the system. The aggregate price now can be written as   
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Substitute [34] to [7] and using [33] we obtain the equilibrium number of firms  
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The aggregate price and welfare are  
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It is noteworthy that welfare is decreasing in B, consumers will be better off in a more 
competitive market. Next we investigate the impacts of openness and trade liberalisation on 
the economy, focusing on the managerial incentives, productivity and welfare effects.  
 
Effects of trade openness and trade liberalisation 
 
Autarky  to Trade 
We first consider the impact of a transition from the closed economy to the open economy. 
Let  
*
T e  and 
*
A e  denote the equilibrium optimal efforts in the open economy and autarky, 
respectively.  Substitute [32] to [33] and rearrange we can rewrite [33] as:   
[38]  r E X T T U f f e B H e J + = + ) , , , ( ) (
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τ τ .   Recall that   
r E A U f e J + = ) (
*  (as shown in [19]) , we obtain : 
 
[39] ) , ( ) ( ) (
* * *
T A T e B H e J e J = −  
  
It can be shown that  0 ) , (
* < T e B H (see appendix E). Recall that  ) (
* e J  is  monotonically 
increasing in  * e  , therefore [39] implies that 
* *
A T e e >  : the optimal effort is greater in the 








=    is increasing in  * e and the average industry marginal cost 
[] ∫ − =
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dF e e a
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α α α γ ) ( *) ( 1 *) (  decreasing in  * e , the open economy equilibrium exhibit a   25
greater power of the incentive contract , managerial efforts , and productivity than autarky. 
The above result can also be shown graphically in Figure 3a.  Comparing equation [14] and 
[32] it is straightforward that the OI schedule is lower in the open economy than that in the 
closed economy24 . Reasoning analogously, the ZEP schedule is also lower in the open 
economy than that in the closed economy.  Thus, both (OI) and (ZEP) schedules will shift 
downwards when the economy moves from autarky to open economy. Intuitively, for a 
given level of  * e  , firm owner’s net payoff  is greater in the open economy than in the 
closed economy , since she can earn extra prospective profits from the export markets. Thus 
if B  remains unchanged or increases, the OI or ZEP condition will fail to hold. As a result, 
for any given  * e ,B  has to be lower in the open economy on both schedules. Hence , in the 
new open economy equilibrium , B   must be lower than the old autarky equilibrium , 
indicating an increasing competitiveness of the market , reflected in the lower demand 
shifter for each individual firm in the domestic market. Since by definition (equation [7]) 
the aggregate price P  increases in  B  , moving from autarky to the open economy also 
reduces aggregate price of the differentiated good sector and is welfare improving. The 
following proposition summarises:  
 
PROPOSITION 4 Under the (HFT) equilibrium, the power of incentive contract ( piece 
rate), managerial effort ,  managerial compensation ,  and  industry productivity will be 
higher when the economy moves from autarky to costly trade. Aggregate price decreases 
and welfare increases.   
 
It is noteworthy that the welfare gains from openness is mainly due to the increasing firm 
productivity (falling marginal costs) – as a result of rising managerial efforts – rather than 
changes in the number of total varieties. Indeed , the impact of changes in the number of 
total varieties is very similar to that shown in Melitz (2003) : whether   ) 1 ( ex T v mp N N + =  
>  A N   is ambiguous , since openness allows consumers to access foreign varieties but may 
also lead to loss of domestic varieties due to more intensified competition in the domestic 
market. It is the “efficiency effect” that always dominates the “variety effect “and leads to 
improving welfare.  
                                                 
24 Note that [32] can be rewritten as  
*) ( '
) , *, , ( *) ( ' *
e V
f e B Y e D
B
X e τ −
= , so for given  * e  , B is lower on [32] 
than [14].   26
 
Falling τ  
 
The above analysis shows that a transition of the regime from autarky to an open economy 
increases managerial incentives and firm productivity, and is welfare enhancing. However, 
very few of the economies of the world today are under autarky, so it is perhaps more 
important to ask how does trade liberalisation – in terms of incremental decrease in trade 
costs – affect firm level managerial incentives and the productivity of the economy. Now 
we analyse the effects of decreasing variable trade costsτ  on  * e  and other key endogenous 
variables. As shown in figure 3b, analogous to the effects of moving from autarky to trade, 
falling  τ  shifts both OI and FE curves downwards25. Intuitively, for a given level of  * e  , 
when trade costs fall , firm owner’s net payoff  increases as a result of increasing expected 
profits from the export market. Thus, if B  remains unchanged or increases, the OI or ZEP 
condition will not hold. Consequently for any given  * e ,B  has to be lower for lower trade 
costs on both schedules. Since both schedules shifts downwards, and the equilibrium point 
is at the bottom of the U shape ZEP schedule , B  must be lower at the new equilibrium 
(lower trade costs), indicating an increasing competitiveness of the markets. Since by 
definition (equation [7]) the aggregate price P  increases in  B  , falling trade costs also 
reduces aggregate price of the differentiated good sector and is welfare improving. More 
importantly, it is yet to be shown whether the new equilibrium  * e  locates at the right or left 
of the old equilibrium. In appendix F, we prove that  * e   is decreasing in τ , i.e. the lower 
the trade costs the higher equilibrium managerial efforts. Hence, for lower τ , the 
equilibrium pair of {} B e*,  will move to the right bottom, meaning a lower B but higher e*. 
We summarise the above results in the following proposition.  
 
PROPOSITION 5   In the (HFT) equilibrium, the power of the incentive contract (piece 
rate), managerial effort and compensation, and industry productivity increase when the 
trade cost τ  decreases. Aggregate price falls and welfare improves.  
 
Proposition 5 immediately implies a negative link between the power of the incentive 
contract and variable trade costs. Although there is little direct empirical evidence on this so 
far, our result seems to be consistent with the finding in Lemieux et al. (2006) that incentive 
                                                 
25 This can be shown by inspection of [32] and [33], noting that  ) , ; *, ( X f B e Y τ is decreasing in  X f , τ .    27
pay has become more important for various occupations in the past two decades while 
barriers to international trade has been falling significantly due to both technological 
improvement and substantial reductions in tariffs. Furthermore, proposition 5 may also 
suggest that the positive correlation between competition and efficiency could be driven by 
a third factor, namely the magnitude of international trade costs, rather than a direct 
causality between the two. As was previously described from figure 3b, falling trade costs 
simultaneously reduces B and increases e*.  Recall that B   is the demand shifter that 
represents the degree of competition (the lower B, the smaller the share of each firm in their 
domestic markets, reflecting a greater “toughness” of the market competition). Thus, falling 
trade costs simultaneously leads to increasing firm productivity - due to greater managerial 
effort- and increasing product market competition – due to the entry of foreign competitors, 
without a direct causality running from the latter to the former.  
 
Finally, it is also note worthy that in our model falling τ   increases both allocative 
efficiency and productive efficiency: allocative efficiency increases since the share of 
output reallocate from less productive non-exporters to high productive exporters26, 
whereas productive efficiency increases (or X-efficiency reduces) since managers work 
harder and less slack, which is achieved with higher agency costs.  
 
Falling  X f  
 
Reasoning analogous to the effects of falling τ  on the OI and ZEP schedule, falling  X f  
shifts both schedules downwards, leading to decrease in B. However, different from the 
effects of falling τ  , we show in the appendix that decrease in  X f  has ambiguous effect on 
* e   . We defer the discussion of the intuition of this result to section 3.4 , but it is 
noteworthy that despite its ambiguous effects on managerial incentives and firm 
productivity , falling fixed costs of exporting still unambiguously increases welfare by 




                                                 
26 The within industry reallocation effect is well known in Melitz (2003). In appendix H we show that such 
effect is also present in our model: when trade costs fall , exporting firms that are more productive will 
expand their shares in total output, whereas non-exporters that are less productive will lose.     28
  How important is firm heterogeneity? The case of quasi-homogeneous 
firms  
 
The preceding analysis assumes that in equilibrium firms are substantially heterogeneous 
and self-select into the export market. But one may wonder how important is the role of 
firm heterogeneity in driving the above results? Would the positive effects of trade 
liberalization on managerial incentives still hold if firms are homogeneous? This question is 
non-trivial, because one contribution of the burgeoning heterogeneous firm trade literature 
is to show how firm heterogeneity adds an important new dimension to understand 
international trade that could not be otherwise explained in a homogeneous firm framework 
(see for example , Helpman , Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Chaney (2005)).  
 
To answer this question, in this section we investigate a benchmark case where firms are 
quasi-homogeneous: the degree of firm heterogeneity is small and trade barrier is low so 
that firm heterogeneity does not matter for their export status i.e. all firms export in the 
equilibrium. (an extreme example is that the range of α is compressed into one single level 
so that firms are identical in their marginal costs, in which case all firms export for low 
trade costs.).  We call this quasi-homogeneous firm trade (QHF) equilibrium.  
 
The following assumption defines the QHF equilibrium that ensures  0 ) ( > a x π  for 
[] M L a a a , ∈ ∀ i.e. all firms earn positive export profits and sell in the foreign markets in the 
open economy:  
 
Assumption 4 Trade costs (τ  and X f ) are low relative to the fixed entry cost  E f  so that 
()
1 1 − − >
σ σ τ x M f a B  .27  
 
Since all firms export, the total operating profit and revenue for each firm is :   
 
                                                 
27 Again , as was the case of assumption 2 , it will be shown below that B  is increasing in  E f and  M a  
decreasing in   E f , so such equilibrium will exist if  E f  is high relative to  τ , X f . Assumption 4 is also 
equivalent to assume that  M α , the upper bound of the stochastic cost element is low , so that firm 
heterogeneity is small and all firms earn positive export profits.      29
 [40]               ( ) [ ] X f a B m Ba a − + =
− − σ σ τ π
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This yields the following pre-entry expected operating profit: 
 
[41]  () E X
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a E f mf e V m B f e a dG a E
M
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Analogous to the case of closed economy, the firm owner will design a contract that 
optimises her expected payoff  ) ( ) ( W E E − π , leading to the optimal managerial effort  * e  
given by F.O.C. 28  
 
[42] *) ( ' *) ( ' ) 1 (
1 e D e V m B = +
−τ τ                    (OI) 
 
Again, analogous to the case of closed economy, in equilibrium free entry yields zero net 
expected payoff:  
 
[43]  () 0 *) ( *) ( ) 1 (
1 = − + − +
− e D f mf e V m B E X
τ τ                      (ZEP)         
 
Combining the (OI) and (ZEP) equations we obtain the following equilibrium condition:  
 
[44]  X E d
d
mf f e D e V
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This equilibrium condition is very similar to that in closed economy as shown in [19], the 
only difference is that the fixed costs is bid up by  X mf  . Intuitively, since all firms sell in 
all foreign markets, the equilibrium will look very similar to that in a integrated world 
market with extra fixed costs of selling in each foreign country. The existence and 
uniqueness of the equilibrium is therefore straightforward:  *) (e J  is  monotonically 
increasing in  * e  , which ensures that [44] has a unique solution Further, as in the case of 
closed economy, equilibrium aggregate variables can all be expressed as monotonic 
functions of  * e  ( see appendix G for more details).   
                                                 
28 The second order condition is always satisfied given assumption 2, also see footnote 11.    30
It is noteworthy that the fixed cost of exporting  X f is now playing the same role as the 




Next we consider the effects of falling trade costs τ  and X f . Firstly, [44] shows that  * e  is 
independent of τ , therefore changes in τ  have no impacts on the equilibrium  * e . Since 








= , average managerial compensation  *) ( ) ( e D U W E r + =  and 
average industrial cost   [] ∫ − =
M
L
dF e e a
α
α α α γ ) ( *) ( 1 *) ( all depends on  * e , falling transport cost 
τ   has no impact on the power of the incentive contract , managerial efforts and 
compensation, and  industrial productivity. However, as can be seen in figure 4a: since both 
the OI and ZEP curves shifts downwards when τ  decreases, the new equilibrium point at 
E’  is lower than the old equilibrium E, meaning a fall in equilibrium B. Thus, the 
equilibrium aggregate price falls and  welfare increases when τ  decreases, although  * e  
remains unchanged.  Secondly, as was shown in figure 4b, falling  X f  will shift the ZEP 
curve downwards, leading to a new equilibrium point at the lower left of the old 
equilibrium, indicating a lower B and  * e .  Therefore, falling  X f  has the same effect on 
aggregate price and welfare as falling τ , but leads to a unambiguously lower power of the 
incentive contract, managerial efforts, and industrial productivity.    
 
These results regarding the effects of falling trade costs on managerial incentives run 
contrast to those shown in the (HFT) equilibrium. Most interestingly, falling fixed costs of 
exporting unambiguously decreases managerial incentives and efforts, leading to lower firm 
level and industrial productivities. The reason could be explained as follows. When all 
firms export, the total fixed cost bared by each firm is the sum of the fixed cost of industry 
entry  E f and exporting  X f . A fall in  X f  thus has the same effect as that of a decreasing 
E f would have in the closed economy. As was shown in proposition 2, falling  E f  reduces 
manager incentives, since it induces new domestic entrants that reduces firms’ market 
shares. In the case of open economy where all firms export, falling  x f  will not only attract 
the entry of new domestic firms since it leads to an increase in the expected profit of 
exporting, but also encourages the entry of new foreign firms. Such massive entry of both   31
foreign and domestic firms reduces firms’ total output 
σ σ τ σ
− − + =
1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( a m B a r and market 
share due to falling B . As a result, firm owners have weaker incentives to encourage 
managers to exert efforts to reduce costs. Thus, firm level marginal cost increases and the 
economy incurs a productivity loss. By contrast , however, decrease in τ  does not decrease 
firm’s total output: they lost their domestic market share since foreign exporters become 
more competitive, but this is compensated by their gains from the export markets due to 
falling transport costs. Hence, the firm level total output was not affected by τ , so the 
managerial incentives provided by firm owners are also independent to τ 29.  
 
 
4. Why firm heterogeneity matters? The Carrot 
and Stick Effects   
 
Comparing the above results from the (QHF) equilibrium and those from (HFT) 
equilibrium highlighted the important role of firm heterogeneity and export market 
selection in the effects of openness on managerial incentives. In this section we reveal why 
firm heterogeneity is so important, and through what mechanism it works to create the 
positive causal link from openness to firm productivity.  
 
The key channel through which openness may raise managerial is the trade-induced “carrot 
and stick effect”.  This effects occurs, when the lowest-cost-exporting firms will be 
rewarded with the “carrot” of increasing total output and profits from trade liberalization, 
whilst the high-cost-non-exporting firms penalised by the “stick” of shrinking output and 
domestic profit due to increasing competition. Thus, the firm owners have stronger 
incentives to provide a high power contract to the managers to encourage them to exert 
greater efforts. Because this will increase (decrease) the firm’s pre-entry probability of 
drawing a low (high) cost and therefore become an exporter (non-exporter), so that the firm 
is more likely to seize the “carrot” and avoid the “stick” in a more open economy.  An 
                                                 
29 Despite their different effects on managerial incentives and industrial productivity, falling τ  and  X f  both 
lead to welfare gains. Falling  X f  raises welfare because it leads to increasing number of total varieties that 
dominates the negative productivity effects, whilst a lower τ   decreases the c.i.f. export prices delivered to 
customers, which reduces the aggregate price and makes them better off.  
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alternative interpretation for this mechanism is that trade liberalization increases the profit 
differential between the high cost and low cost status drawn from the cost distribution, 
which raises the “value of cost reduction”.30 Consequently, managerial effort devoted to 
reduce cost reduction becomes more “valuable” to the firms, which in turn motives the 
owners to design a higher power incentive contract to induce managers to work harder.     
 
To see this mechanism more clearly, first consider the effects of falling τ  on firms profits 
) (a π  and  outputs  ) (a r . If the firm draws a high cost (above the export cost cut off) 
[] M X a a a , ∈ after entry, it becomes a non-exporter so that   e d f Ba a a − = =
−σ π π
1 ) ( ) (  and 
σ σ
− = =
1 ) ( ) ( Ba a r a r d . Apparently, a lower τ   leads to lower profits and outputs 
( 0 ) ( > ∂ ∂ τ π a , 0 ) ( > ∂ ∂ τ a r ), since B  decreases with falling τ  (as shown in figure 3b 
and proved in the appendix). Intuitively, falling trade costs leads to increasing product 
market competition that reduces firms’ domestic profit and output.  On the contrary, if a 
firm draws a low cost (below the export cost cutoff) [ ] X L a a a , ∈  and becomes an exporter, 
its total profit and output is  
 
[45]     ) ( - ） 1 ( ) (
1 1
x e X d mf f m Ba a + + = + =
− − σ σ τ π π π  ,     
            ） 1 ( ) (
1 1 σ σ τ σ
− − + = + = m Ba r r a r X d  
 
As was shown the appendix H,  τ π ∂ ∂ ) (a  <0  and 0 ) ( < ∂ ∂ τ a r : when τ  falls, the firms’ 
loss of the domestic profit (  0 > ∂ ∂ τ π d ) and output will be more than compensated by the 
increase in its export profit ( 0 < ∂ ∂ τ π X ) and output, leading to a net increase in  ) (a π  and 
) (a r  for  [] X L a a a , ∈ .  Hence, falling τ  unambiguously magnifies the profit differential 
between the low cost and high cost status. As a result, firm owners would like to reward the 
managers by more if they achieve a “good” cost draw and export, but also penalize them by 
more if the cost draw turns out to be “bad” and the firm remains non-exporting. This means 
a higher optimal contractual piece rate b in equilibrium, leading to a greater managerial 
effort and average firm productivity.   
 
                                                 
30 It is common in the Schumpeterian literature that the incentives to innovate depends on the differences, 
rather than the absolute size of pre- and post innovation rents. See for example Trindade (2005) .    33
Secondly, such “carrot and stick” effect, may not be necessarily at work when  X f falls. As 
was shown in the appendix, the effects of falling  X f  on the profits of exporting firms 
( ) (a X π  and  ) (a rX ,  [] X L a a a , ∈ ) is ambiguous31, which may even lead to a decrease in the 
profit differential between exporter and non exporters. This well explains the ambiguous 
results regarding the effects of falling  X f   on the managerial incentives and firm 
productivity as described in section 3.1.  
  
Finally, in the (QHF) equilibrium, such “carrot and stick” effect is totally shut down, since 
firms do not select into the export market so that trade liberalization affect firm profits and 

















 , indicating that the profit differential between high cost and low 
firms remains unchanged when τ  falls , but decreases when  X f  falls32. Hence, the value 
of cost reduction and the marginal value of managerial effort are non-increasing under 
falling trade costs, leading to unchanged or even a lower optimal contractual piece rate and 
therefore lower managerial effort and firm productivity.33   
 
To summarise, in Table 1 we list the t impacts of falling trade costs on managerial 





                                                 
31 This result is also pointed out in the original Melitz (2003) model. However in his model falling 
X f unambiguously increases aggregate productivity despite it ambiguous effects on market share reallocation.  
32 Let a  and a  represents any cost level within the boundaries of cost distribution a  > a , 
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33 It is also worth noting that there is possibly a second mechanism is at work through which firms provide 
stronger managerial incentives to reduce costs when trade costs fall: saving labour costs. As was shown 
previously, the aggregate price falls when trade costs decrease, which means an increase in the real wage. 
Since labour becomes more expensive, firms have stronger incentives to save labour costs by raising labour 
productivity. This “labour cost saving” effect is also discussed in Hornet a.  (1994) in an oligopoly industry 
model.   
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Table 1 : Falling Trade costs and the carrot and stick effects  
 







Changes in profit 
differential 
 τ   + Increase  HFT equilibrium 
(export selection) 
X f   +/- Undetermined 
τ   0 unaffected  QHF equilibrium 
(all firms export) 
X f   - Decrease 
 
It is noteworthy that the result that trade liberalization might reward the high productivity 
firms and punishes the least productive firms within the same industry is not completely 
earth breaking. This is actually the central mechanism revealed by Melitz (2003) that leads 
to inter firm reallocations and thus aggregate productivity gains. What is new in our model, 
however, is that such “reward and penalty“ effect stemming from the importance of firm 
heterogeneity is not only important to the inter-firm reallocation effect as stressed in Melitz 
(2003) , but also the key dimension to explain the intra-firm productivity gains/losses 
induced by trade liberalization. Whilst increasing openness of the economy may reallocate 
the market shares away from low productivity firms towards high productivity firms, our 
analysis show that firm may not only react passively by adjusting their output margins, but 
also might foresee the threats and opportunities brought by increasing openness and 
therefore adapt their internal contract structure proactively to cope with the changing global 
market environment. Hence, by incorporating the principal-agent problem into the 
heterogeneous firm trade framework, we can attribute the trade-induced intra-firm 
productivity gains at least partly to the optimal incentive contract mechanism, which could 
be viewed as complementary to the inter-firm reallocation mechanism in the original Melitz 
(2003) model in explaining the link between trade barriers and aggregate productivity.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
Recent empirical trade studies often find that increasing openness boosts firm productivity 
( see Tybout 2003 and Greenaway and Kneller 2007 for a survey). One theoretical puzzle   35
arising from this result is that, if productivity improvement is profit-increasing, why firms 
did not implement them earlier but waited until the economy becomes more opened up? 
Perhaps one plausible approach to solve this puzzle is to break into the “black box” of cost-
minimising firms and investigate how openness could affect the organizational structure 
within the firm. Recent developments in trade theory have made several successful attempts 
in that direction, but far from reaching a consensus yet.  
 
Motivated by recent empirical evidence that firm level productivity is highly associated 
with (good) management practice and (strong) managerial incentives (Bandiera , Barankay 
and Rasul 2007,  Bloom and Rennen 2007), we have presented a model that incorporates 
the principal-agent mechanism into the heterogeneous firm trade framework based on 
Melitz (2003), in which firms could self-select into the export market whilst their 
productivities depends on the intra-firm optimal managerial incentive contract.  One new 
mechanism we reveal in our model via which “openness boosts productivity” is the “carrot 
and stick effect”:  when the economy is more opened up, the low-cost-exporting firms 
could be rewarded with increasing profit due to their expansion in the global market, 
whereas the high-cost-purely-domestic firms would be penalized by decreasing profit 
resulting from fiercer import competition.  If such “carrot and stick” effect is at work, cost-
reducing managerial effort will generate a greater value to the firm owners , who would 
therefore like to provide the managers with a contract with stronger managerial incentives 
to motivate them working harder, and thus improve management practice and boosts 
productivity.  
 
Our paper further shows that there are, however, conditions under which such openness-
induced “carrot and stick” effect is at work. Specifically, this mechanism is present only 
when firms are substantially heterogeneous and openness is triggered by falling variable 
trade costs. When firms are quasi-homogeneous – defined as low productivity spread and 
trade costs – so that all firms export in equilibrium, openness affects profits of all firms in 
the same direction, therefore will never increase the profit differential between low-cost and 
high-cost firms, and thus do not raise managerial incentives. We have also shown that 
falling fixed costs of exporting could have ambiguous results on profits of low-cost-
exporting firms in the heterogeneous firm equilibrium, which therefore may not necessarily 
boosts managerial incentives and productivity.   
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Our model has revealed the crucial role of firm heterogeneity in the openness-induced 
productivity gains via the managerial incentives mechanism.  It is often argued that 
globalisation brings both threat and opportunity to the economy, and one specific 
mechanism is that only the best firms can benefit from the opportunity, whilst the worst 
firms will unambiguously lose. Such reallocation effects, which heavily replies on the 
assumption of firm heterogeneity, is the main building block in the new heterogeneous firm 
trade framework pioneered by Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003) , Yeaple (2005) and 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2007). By incorporating the managerial incentive mechanism into 
the Melitz (2003) model, we are able to show that the second order effect of the reallocation 
effect is that firms may also react proactively to such new opportunity and threats by 
adjusting their internal incentive schemes, which could provide a useful mechanism to 
understand the “openness boosts productivity” argument.  
 
While our model stresses the importance of firm heterogeneity and managerial incentive 
mechanism, there are certainly other plausible mechanisms explaining the positive 
openness-productivity link. As pointed out by Bernard et al. (2006), international 
technology transfer, incentives to invest in research and development and changes in 
product mix of firms may also play a role. However, our model yields some distinguishing 
testable hypotheses that may differentiate us from other explanations.  In particular, we 
show that that the power of the incentive contract (piece rate) and the average managerial 
compensation is greater when variable trade costs fall, which is generally consistent with 
recent evidence that the incidences of incentive pay in the U.S. has increases substantially 
in the last two decades during which period the variable trade costs have declined sharply.  
Furthermore, our model allows us to derive how the effects of openness on managerial 
incentives and firm productivity vary with the degree of firm heterogeneity and export 
selection across industries; these may be interesting questions for further empirical 
investigations using more detailed firm level data.  
 
Our model very parsimoniously captures the significantly complex role of managerial 
incentive structure in shaping firm behaviours. To achieve this parsimony we abstracted 
from many features of managerial characteristics in the real world.  For example, we 
omitted the heterogeneity of managers’ abilities and their attitude towards risks, we 
completely ignored the dynamics of managerial behaviours, and we assumed away the 
financial constraint problems that are one of the main obstacles to firms’ overseas   37
expansions.  Future research could be directed towards extending this line of research to a 
comprehensive framework that incorporates these features and explains the complex 
interactions between international trade and managerial behaviours. We hope our model has 
brought trade theory closer to the evidence , and serves as an important first step towards 
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Figure 3a.   Effects of moving from autarky to open economy 
Figure 3b.   Effects of falling Trade costs    40
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Figure 4b.   Effects of falling  X f  in quasi-homogenous firms case   42
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Appendix  
 
A  Proof of U shape ZEP curve  
 
The ZEP condition in [18] can be rewritten as  
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As shown in footnote 13 ,  0 *) ( ' > e J  , therefore  0 ) ( *) ( ' > < e B  when 
* ) ( * E e e > <   , where 
*
E e  satisfies 
0 ) (
* = E e J . In words, the ZEP curve is decreasing in  * e  before point E  and then increasing in  * e  after 
crossing E.  Furthermore, it can be shown that 0 *) ( ' ' > e B , since [ ] 0 ' ' *) (
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B  Proof of proposition 2 
 
Using   [] Ω − =
−σ γ
1 ) ( 1 ) ( e e V , we can rewrite equation [19] as : 
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C Proof of lemma 2  
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By assumption 3, the right hand side of [C.1] is increasing in  * e  :   0
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e B Y e D e τ
 but 
decreasing in B.  Now suppose B   is decreasing in  * e . If so , then when  * e  increases the right hand side of 
[C.1]  increases , and the left hand side decreases , thus equation [C.1] can not be hold , leading to 
contradiction. Therefore B   must be increasing in  * e .  
 
 
D Proof of proposition 3  
 
Under lemma 2, the left hand side of (33) is a function of  * e .  So we can rewrite the ZEPcondition as :  
 
[D.1]  () r E X U f e D f e e B Y e V e B e Q + = − + ≡ *) ( , *, *), ( *) ( *) ( *) ( τ  
 
Taking differentiation of the left hand side with respect to  * e yields:  
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Using equation (32) we obtain: 
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Thus, since  *) (e Q   is monotonically increasing  * e  and  0 ) 0 ( = Q , there exists a unique and strictly 
positive solution  * e  to    r E U f e Q + = *) ( .  Further, from lemma 2, there also exists a unique 
equilibriumB determined by equilibrium  * e according to equation (32).  
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Rewrite [32] as  ()
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For expositional convenience next we use  *) (e Y  and    *) ( ' e Y  to  represent  () X f e B Y , *, , τ  and  
() X e f e B Y , *, , * τ  , and  *) (e Γ  represent  *) ( 1 e γ − .  We need to prove:  
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− − − Γ = φ α σ  . Using Leibiniz rule , we obtain : 
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Therefore the right hand side of inequality is  
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F.  Proof of proposition 5 
 

























∂ ) , *, (
*) ( '
*
) , *, (
*) ( '












































) , *, (
*) ( ' '
*
) , *, (
*) ( ' '
*
*
















   [F.2]       
 

























) 1 . (
τ τ
    [F.3]        (using [32]) 
 




*) ( ' '
*
















































  [F.4]   (using [E.3] ) 
 




















Since by assumption 3, the denominator of the right hand side of [F.4]
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So we only need to prove the numerator 
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             [F.5]       (using F.1) 
 
Since the right hand side of [F.5] can be written as : 
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Hence , equilibrium [F.5] is equivalent to :  
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H  Carrot and Stick Effects  
 
 
In this appendix we prove a low cost exporting firm’s profit and total output increases when trade cost τ  falls.  
  
Profit of an exporter is  ( ) E X f mf a m B a + − + =
− − σ σ τ π
1 1 ) 1 ( ) (  , therefore   
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. Further , since 
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1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( a m B a r , so exporting firms also increase their total 



























σ σ α α τ α α α α τ σ
τ
) ( ) ( ) ( 1


















 i.e. firm level operating profit (and thus total sales) does not respond to trade costs when 
all firms export.  
 
In equilibrium  *) ( ' ) (
*
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.  When firms are heterogeneous, as was proved in appendix 
















 is unchanged when τ  falls, but decreases when  x f  falls.   
(q.e.d.) 